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Notions of Fairness Versus the Pareto Principle:
On the Role of Logical Consistency
Louis Kaplow and Steven ShavellW
In other writing, we advance the thesis that legal policies should be
evaluated solely on the basis of their effects on individuals' well-being,
meaning that no independent evaluative weight should be accorded to
notions of fairness.' In that work, we consider a variety of principles of
fairness, justice, and corollary concepts that are conventionally employed in
the assessment of legal rules.2 In the course of our research, we discovered
that each of the leading notions of fairness that we examined could be
shown to conflict with the Pareto principle; that is, consistent adherence to
any of the notions of fairness would, in some circumstances, make
everyone worse off. This observation led us to inquire about the generality
of the conflict, and we explored it in two articles. In the first, we
demonstrated that, in symmetric settings (in which every person is similarly
situated), every individual will necessarily be made worse off whenever a
welfare-independent notion of fairness is decisive.3 In the second, a short,
technical article intended for economists, we presented a formal proof of
the proposition that, in all cases (symmetric or not), if a welfare-
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have benefited from numerous exchanges with Howard Chang concerning the substance and
many of the details presented in this comment during the year prior to our receiving the final
version of his article. Our comment does not, however, reflect any particular points that may be
raised in his rejoinder, which we have not seen as of this writing.
1. Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, PRINCIPLES OF FAIRNESS VERSUS HUMAN
WELFARE: ON THE EVALUATION OF LEGAL POLICY (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus.,
Harvard Law Sch., Discussion Paper No. 277, 2000),forthcoming in 114 HARV. L. REV. (2001).
2. We note, however, that many notions of fairness concerned solely with income distribution
are not included in the notions of fairness that we examine and criticize. This is because many
distributive concerns involve individuals' well-being and are thus, by definition, accommodated in
the welfare economic framework that we defend. Id. secs. Il.A-.B. Indeed, we do not formally
limit the distributive principles that may be employed (the favored distribution could be utilitarian
or egalitarian, or one could give more to Joe because he is tall and less to Jill because her
preferences are objectionable), although, of course, the spirit of some of our arguments and others
that could be adduced would narrow the range of plausible distributive principles substantially.
3. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, The Conflict Between Notions of Fairness and the Pareto
Principle, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 63 (1999).
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independent notion ' of fairness is given any weight in making social
decisions, there will exist circumstances in which everyone is made worse
off.4
Howard Chang has written an article in this journal that addresses
aspects of our second article.5 He accepts the validity of our formal proof,
but he challenges the appeal of our assumptions. Furthermore, he suggests
that certain notions of fairness that do not satisfy these assumptions,
including his own conception of liberal welfarism, could be sufficiently
modified so that they would not conflict with the Pareto principle. (Chang's
precise claim is unclear, however. The overall thrust of his article may give
the reader the impression that many familiar notions of fairness might be
susceptible to modification so as to avoid conflict with the Pareto principle,
yet the analysis itself suggests only the logical possibility that the conflict
can be circumvented with respect to modifications of certain types of
notions of fairness, which are not formally specified.6)
We begin this Reply by summarizing the demonstration in our first
paper of the conflict between notions of fairness and the Pareto principle.
This demonstration, which Chang does not contest, is easier to understand
than our second, and it is independently sufficient to establish our
conclusion. Then we consider our second, more technical demonstration of
our conclusion. We emphasize that the two assumptions that Chang
challenges are really minimal in character; in essence, they amount to
requirements that normative theories be logically consistent. (Indeed, the
relevance of centuries of moral philosophers' normative discourse depends
on one of these assumptions.) We also explain how, even when one does
not require logical consistency in the respects to be articulated, Chang's
effort to show that certain notions of fairness can be altered so as to avoid
4. Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, ANY NON-INDIVIDUALISTIC SOCIAL WELFARE
FUNCTION VIOLATES THE PARETO PRINCIPLE (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 7051, 1999),forthcoming as Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Any Non-Welfarist Method of
Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle, 109 J. POL. ECON. (2001).
5. Howard Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto
Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173 (2000). Chang also considers other matters (notably, he criticizes an
argument of Amartya Sen) that we do not take up here.
6. We should note at the outset that we have experienced general difficulty in interpreting
Chang's article. Despite his technical economic training, Chang does not translate his argument
and examples into unambiguous, formal statements or offer proofs of any of his claims, although
our article to which he is responding consists almost entirely of formal statements and presents a
proof of its main claim. The problem of Chang's imprecision includes the definition of fairness
itself. We formally defined how we were using the term in each of our writings, KAPLOW &
SHAVELL, supra note 4, at 2; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 65-66 n.5; KAPLOW &
SHAVELL, supra note 1, at 39 n.69, whereas we are not always sure whether Chang uses the term
fairness in the same manner (for example, we cannot be sure he is excluding purely distributive
notions, as we do, see supra note 2). Chang neither mentions our precise, formal definition at any
point nor offers any definition of his own. (And, despite Chang's apparent displeasure with our
definition, we note that it does encompass all of the many leading notions of fairness that we
examine in KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 1, pts. fIi-VI.)
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conflicts with the Pareto principle is unsuccessful. Finally, we offer brief
remarks on Chang's liberal welfarism, drawing upon arguments from our
larger work.
Before proceeding, we should note that we are well aware that many
readers will be reluctant to accept our claims. First, the idea that all
plausible notions of fairness conflict with the Pareto principle may seem
surprising; indeed, it came as a surprise to us during the course of our
research. Yet, analysis has revealed it to be true to a general extent. Second,
some of our analysis-particularly the second demonstration with which
Chang takes issue-is of a technical nature. We endeavor to explain the
relevant points in accessible terms so the reader can see what is really
involved in considering them. Third, the fact that notions of fairness have
broad intuitive appeal to everyone-including to us-seems in tension with
our critique. In our conclusion, however, we briefly draw upon our other
writing to sketch some of the ways that this appeal can be reconciled with
our overall thesis that notions of fairness should not be employed as
independent evaluative principles in the assessment of legal policy.
I. OUR FIRST DEMONSTRATION: NOTIONS OF FAIRNESS ALWAYS
MAKE EVERYONE WORSE OFF IN SYMMETRIC CASES
A basic, natural setting to consider is the symmetric case: that in which
all persons are similarly situated with respect to the policies under
consideration. For example, in analyzing tort rules and the principle of
corrective justice in the context of automobile accidents, one might
examine cases in which every person is equally likely to be an injurer or
victim and faces the same costs of accident avoidance, the same harm if an
accident occurs, and so forth.
In such symmetric settings, we have demonstrated that, whenever a
notion of fairness leads one to choose a policy different from that which
would be chosen were the social goal concerned exclusively with effects on
individuals' well-being, everyone will necessarily be made worse off.7 The
reasoning is straightforward. Suppose that a notion of fairness leads to the
choice of legal rule A when overall well-being would be greater under rule
B. Since overall well-being is greater under rule B, and since each person is
identically situated, it must be that each person's well-being is greater under
rule B (and by the same amount). Hence, everyone is made worse off by
choosing rule A.
This simple demonstration, which Chang does not question, is by itself
sufficient to establish that there is a conflict between any notion of fairness
and the Pareto principle. For if one endorses a notion of fairness,
7. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 68-70.
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consistency requires that one cannot ignore symmetric cases, in which the
conflict arises.'
Moreover, we suggest in our writing that the symmetric case has
special significance for a range of systems of morality, including those
associated with the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative, and choice
behind a "veil of ignorance." 9 The reason is that such frameworks, which
are designed to capture a notion of impartiality among individuals, in
essence require that proposed moral principles pass muster in symmetric
settings. (Consider, for example, the categorical imperative. If one did not
demand that individuals be viewed as if they were symmetrically situated, a
person who is mighty could advance the principle "might makes right," for
such a person would happily generalize that principle, as that would simply
enlarge his or her personal benefit. Only if one is required to assume
symmetry among individuals-that no person is more mighty than another,
or that a person is not more mighty than others any more often than anyone
else is-would the test of the categorical imperative rule out such a self-
interested principle.) We suspect that many readers, as well as most
commentators upon whom Chang relies for various normative principles,
do endorse the fundamental requirement of impartiality that is embodied in
these frameworks. Thus, our demonstration that notions of fairness can only
make individuals worse off in the symmetric case should be viewed as
particularly important.
II. OUR SECOND DEMONSTRATION: IN GENERAL, NOTIONS OF
FAIRNESS SOMETIMES MAKE EVERYONE WORSE OFF
In our second demonstration that any notion of fairness conflicts with
the Pareto principle, we do not restrict analysis to symmetric settings. We
believe it will be helpful to sketch our proof briefly. (The proof is
somewhat abstract, and we ask the reader to bear with us.) Let us begin by
considering any notion of fairness. (For example, consider the principle of
corrective justice, under which wrongdoers are required to compensate their
victims.) Now, as a theoretical matter, if this notion of fairness is given any
weight (that is, if, other things equal, it sometimes affects the social
8. To an extent, Chang can be seen as challenging this demonstration, because, as we explain
in Part II, he does not seem to accept the view that normative principles have to be applied
consistently. We do note, however, that the continuity assumption that he challenges regarding
our second demonstration is not employed in our first demonstration.
The reader may wonder about notions of fairness concerned with the distribution of income
or well-being, which would be moot in symmetric cases. As we indicate above in note 2, however,
such principles are not among the notions of fairness that we criticize, and we are explicit about
this in our prior writing. E.g., Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 67; KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra
note 1, sec. ll.A.
9. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 73-74.
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decision), we must be able to imagine two regimes--call them Fair and
Unfair-that have the following characteristics: First, every individual is
equally well off in Fair and in Unfair; and second, one regime-Fair-is
definitely more fair than the other, Unfair, and hence it is deemed
normatively superior."° (To be concrete, suppose that Unfair, unlike Fair,
does not follow the requirement of corrective justice that wrongdoers
compensate victims in a class of cases; nevertheless, injurers are not better
off than in Fair because they pay higher fines in Unfair, and victims are not
worse off in Unfair because social insurance is provided to them.)
Next, consider a slightly modified unfair regime, Unfair-I, that is
identical to Unfair except in one respect: There is a tiny savings of
administrative costs in Unfair-lI, which is distributed uniformly per capita.
Now, if fairness has any real weight, it must be true that Fair is deemed
superior overall to Unfair-I: After all, Fair was definitely superior to
Unfair, Unfair-lI is every bit as unfair as Unfair, and the cost advantage of
Unfair-lI over Unfair was stated to be tiny. (For example, compared to
Fair, suppose that Unfair-II involves a major sacrifice of corrective justice
and a trivial administrative cost savings, perhaps a penny per person.)
However, observe that everyone is worse off in Fair than in Unfair-Il. (This
is because everyone is equally well off in Fair and in Unfair, while
everyone is worse off in Unfair than in Unfair-Il.) Hence, the notion of
fairness has been shown to conflict with the Pareto principle."
10. Chang, supra note 5, at 222 n.193, questions our observation to this effect and refers to
our making strong and demanding assumptions, but we see his comments as red herrings. We
simply ask the reader to contemplate the converse: Suppose that no matter how much the degree
of fairness differed between two regimes, a notion of fairness never implied that one regime was
superior to another when all else was equal, namely, when everyone had the same level of well-
being. Clearly, there is no sense in which the notion of fairness is receiving any independent
weight. (Put technically, our formal definition asks whether an evaluative principle can be
implemented if the analyst knows how regimes affect individuals' well-being but has no
information about any other characteristics of the regimes, including how fair they are. If the
supposition in the text is false, then the analyst can make the evaluation knowing only well-being
(for whenever the information on well-being is the same, so is the assessment); hence, as we
define it, there is no independent notion of fairness involved.)
We are also puzzled by Chang's statements in the same note that our language usage
(concerning the meaning of an "individualistic" social welfare function) is ambiguous and
inconsistent. First, we offer a formal definition for the term in question. KAPLOW & SHAVELL,
supra note 4, at 2. Second, our other use of the term to which Chang refers is also formally stated.
Id. Third, although we do not offer a formal proof of stated equivalence between our two usages,
this is only because the equivalence in our framework is (we thought) obvious. (When Chang
questioned the equivalence, we supplied him with the proof, tracking the above-described
intuition, which he has not questioned.)
11. Consider another way to see the intuition behind the general argument (which, to prove
rigorously, requires stronger assumptions). (1) Suppose that there exist two regimes, F and W,
such that F is more fair, welfare is higher in W, and F is viewed as superior overall to W. (This
must be true of at least some such choices of F and W if fairness ever determines social choice.)
(2) Construct W' from regime W as follows: Maintain the same degree of (un)fairness and total
welfare, but redistribute income such that the resulting distribution of well-being in W' is the same
as in F. (If, for example, the redistribution reduces inequality and one's welfare assessment favors
a more egalitarian outcome, the overall adjustment in generating W' from W would reduce total
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We now can consider the two assumptions that Chang challenges. The
first, referred to in formal literature as "continuity," involves our
formulation of the idea that a notion of fairness has "real" weight. The
justification for our continuity assumption will, we believe, be apparent
once we make its meaning and implications clear (which, we believe,
Chang does not do).12 Continuity, which we use in its standard
mathematical sense 3 in our proof, turns out to have a fairly simple meaning
here, namely that the weight given to a notion of fairness is not
infinitesimal. In other words, we assumed that a given, perhaps
unboundedly large amount of unfairness was more important than some,
however small, savings in administrative costs (shared per capita). The
contrary assumption-which is really what Chang, upon examination, is
asking readers to embrace'n-is that, no matter how much unfairness is
involved, it can be outweighed by the tiniest amount of administrative cost
savings, whether it be one cent or even one billionth of a cent. (We
emphasize that if one caps the fairness-cost tradeoff at, say, a trillion to one,
then continuity formally obtains and our proof holds; it truly is the case that
one must embrace the most extreme view of the triviality of the weight to
be given to fairness to avoid our conclusion.) We grant that our rejection of
income sufficiently to keep total welfare constant.) (3) Since F is more fair than W' by the same
amount that it was more fair than W, and since welfare is no higher in W than it was in W, it must
be that F is deemed overall superior to W'. (4) However, W' has higher total welfare than F and
also the same distribution of welfare as F (that is how we constructed W'). Hence, everyone must
be worse off in F than in W, even though F is judged to be superior overall under the notion of
fairness.
12. Chang's most direct statement about continuity is, we believe, misleading. He states that
"[t]here is no apparent reason why a slight increase in consumption of some good might not have
a discontinuous impact on social welfare, especially if it is so widespread as to be shared by all
individuals in society." Chang, supra note 5, at 224. First, he does not explain, as we do in the
text to follow, that discontinuity means that the ratio of the impact on social welfare to small
changes in consumption becomes infinite (as one considers smaller and smaller changes in
consumption). Thus, any slight increase in consumption (say, a peanut per capita) is posited by
Chang, in finding discontinuity plausible, to be vastly more important than any degree of
unfairness, no matter how large. (This explains why Chang's other statements, see id. at 210-11 &
n.165, are also incorrect with regard to the concept of continuity.) Second, the idea that the
number of individuals might be relevant is fallacious, for the amount of increase in the
consumption good per person can be arbitrarily small-indeed, whatever unit one imagines (say,
one peanut) can be divided by the number of people in determining how much of a per capita
increase to consider (so, if the population is a million, we can imagine each individual gaining by
only a millionth of a peanut). In addition, Chang states that the literature on social choice theory
generally does not assume continuity. Id. at 224 n.197. Chang does not mention, however, that
continuity is often moot in much of that literature, because it is concerned only with discrete
possibilities (that is, it does not allow anything, such as the amount of a good an individual has, to
vary gradually) and because it uses only rankings (which, for example, allows no statements about
degrees of preference or well-being, which renders consideration of most notions of distributive
justice impossible). In our more encompassing and realistic framework, the assumption of
continuity is relevant and, as we explain in the text, compelling.
13. Chang repeatedly refers to our "particular" continuity property, e.g., id. at 223, although
our usage is entirely standard, straight from any textbook or dictionary that includes mathematical
terms.
14. See id. at 222-26.
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Chang's view does amount to an assumption, but it is one that we imagined
would be endorsed by anyone who believed that a notion of fairness was
worth taking seriously.15 (And, not surprisingly, virtually all notions of
fairness we have studied, including all of the major ones we examine in
detail in our main project, do not violate this continuity assumption.)
We offer some brief, additional remarks about our continuity
assumption. (1) Formally, our argument only requires that the principle of
fairness be continuous in something. (Hence, corrective justice should not
be given infinitesimal weight with respect to administrative cost savings,
trivial aesthetic pleasures, or the consumption of some good-in other
words, to some factor that is unrelated to the notion of fairness.) (2) For our
proof not to apply to a notion of fairness, the discontinuities that Chang
suggests be allowed must exist not merely here or there, but in every
conceivable setting in which a notion of fairness might be given any weight
(for our proof that a Pareto conflict can be shown to exist applies at every
point where fairness matters). (3) The direction of the involved
discontinuity is opposite to that which is sometimes posited. That is, the
required discontinuity gives absolute weight to, say, administrative costs, so
that consideration of such costs would trump any amount of unfairness,
rather than vice versa.
The second assumption implicit in our demonstration that Chang
challenges is "independence." 16 At its core, the notion of independence that
we employ (which differs from the one that is the subject of part of Chang's
discussion) 7 is an aspect of logical consistency, and, as such, we are quite
surprised that Chang questions it. One way to express our independence
assumption is as follows. Suppose that a person believes that regime X is
clearly morally superior to regime Y, and also that regime Y is clearly
morally superior to regime Z. Then, our independence assumption holds
that that person is not free to assert that regime Z is clearly morally superior
15. For example, we would not take seriously a notion of fairness that was used to break
literal ties (where even a fraction of a cent would swing the decision one way or the other) but that
otherwise never mattered.
16. Chang, supra note 5, at 226-32.
17. Chang suggests that our independence assumption is analogous to that used in Arrow's
Theorem and thus may be subject to criticism. Id. at 226-29. But our independence assumption is,
in important respects, weaker than Arrow's. Arrow assumed that the social ranking of X and Z can
depend only on different individuals' rankings of X and Z-and thus not on the intensity of their
preferences or on any difference between one individual's gain and another's loss (interpersonal
comparisons). This limitation implies, among other things, that ordinary distributive judgments
are ruled out in social decisionmaking. This aspect of Arrow's assumption is specifically
identified by those Chang quotes, id. at 228-29 & n.206, in support of the contention that
independence is a controversial assumption. See ALFRED F. MACKAY, ARROW'S THEOREM: THE
PARADOX OF SOCIAL CHOICE 48 (1980); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 393-95 (1989).
Our independence assumption, by contrast, does not rule out preference intensities or
interpersonal comparisons (and thus allows distributive judgments). Rather, it only requires
logical consistency in the sense discussed in the text. Chang does not mention this crucial
difference.
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to regime X on the ground that regime Y is not "on the table" in some
sense."s (For example, only regimes X and Z may currently be before the
decisionmaker, or regime Y may not be politically or practically feasible.)
Chang rejects this implication. In rejecting our independence assumption,
he is asserting that the morally correct choice between X and Z generally
should, as a matter of principle, depend on the presence or absence of Y-
even when it is acknowledged that Y should never be chosen in any event.
Quite frankly, we find his position absurd.19 (We also note that philosophers
have always emphasized the importance of logical consistency in the sense
at issue; indeed, their frequent use of hypothetical examples to illuminate
moral questions, including hypothetical constructs such as the categorical
imperative, means that they consider them relevant for normative choices
even though, being hypothetical, they are not "on the table" at the moment
of a particular, actual decision.)
Though we may be belaboring the obvious, we note some implications
of violating independence. (1) One would need a criterion to determine
which regimes were and were not to count as on the table (which seems
hard to come by since we are considering regimes that are not going to be
chosen in any event). (2) Chang's proposed procedure (described below)
deems feasible regimes to be those on the table,2" but without costly inquiry
(which is hardly worthwhile if the regimes are not to be chosen), one may
not know which these are. (3) One's normative choice would change as
18. It may not be apparent how our proof, sketched above, uses this assumption. One way to
express the point is that, when we hypothetically contemplated regime Unfair-li, we implicitly
assumed that the statement that regime Fair was superior to regime Unfair was not thereby
rendered invalid. To be sure, as we note in the text to follow, it is common and appropriate in
moral argument to change one's view in some cases through the contemplation of other cases. Our
point is that, once one believes one has arrived at a complete and correct moral view, after
considering all imaginable cases, one is not free to proclaim both that X is morally superior to Z
and that Z is morally superior to X, solely depending on what else is stated to be "on the table" at
the moment of an actual decision. (We acknowledge that there may be some instances in which a
choice might be said to depend upon other options, such as when a person might be upset at the
very fact that an available, preferred option has been rejected, but such possibilities are irrelevant
in our framework because the regimes that are to be assessed by a normative criterion are
explicitly defined as complete descriptions, see KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 4, at 1, which
would already include any such feelings. The moral question is: Given all such information,
which is morally superior, X or Z?)
19. In some of our private correspondence, Chang seemed to accept our view that rejecting
independence was morally indefensible, indicating that he merely wished to establish as a logical
matter that our position depended on this assumption. Now it is surely correct that logic itself does
not require that one accept logical consistency in normative analysis, but if this is the extent of his
challenge, then there is no dispute about whether the assumption is ultimately an appropriate-
indeed, a compelling-one. In fact, elsewhere in his article, he takes Sen to task for deeming a
hypothetical regime irrelevant to moral analysis on grounds of infeasibility: Sen's "objections go
to the 'pragmatic' question of whether the solution is feasible, not to the 'ethical' question of
whether the trade would be socially desirable if it were available to us as a social choice, and it
is the ethical question that is relevant for our purposes here." Chang, supra note 5, at 202; see
also id. at 202 n.135 (citing Hammond's statement that arguments such as Sen's involve
"misconceptions" due to "confusion").
20. Id. at 214.
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views on the feasibility of such other regimes change (and feasibility might
even change if, say, self-interested individuals spend resources to make
regimes feasible, just to change the social choice-again, even though the
newly feasible regime would not be chosen). In all, we are truly at a loss in
understanding why Chang insists on taking such an approach.2'
Suppose, however, that one follows Chang and is willing to consider
notions of fairness that do not have the basic elements of consistency that
we have described. One might imagine from the tenor of Chang's reply that
it then would be straightforward to construct notions of fairness that did not
violate the Pareto principle. But this is not the case. Our second
demonstration shows that our assumptions are sufficient to imply that all
notions of fairness conflict with the Pareto principle; it is not suggested that
they are necessary, and they are not. Hence, it is possible that notions of
fairness that do not obey our assumptions will still conflict with the Pareto
principle. Now Chang does not offer direct, precisely stated examples of
existing, modified, or novel notions of fairness under which the conflict
with the Pareto principle is avoided; nor, correspondingly, does he indicate
the nature of such principles (an important question, given how strange they
may have to be once our consistency assumptions are violated).22 Instead,
he describes procedures under which a conventional notion of fairness is
the input and, he asserts, a modified notion of fairness that is free of Pareto
conflicts is yielded as the output.23 Chang's procedures do not, however,
seem to advance his position.
21. To illustrate some of the problems with both of his arguments about our assumptions, we
offer an example that is in the spirit of much of Chang's discussion of the idea that individuals
should he allowed to waive (alienate) their rights if it is to their advantage. In regime A, Bill, the
richest, most well-off (and most unpleasant) person in the society does very well, and every other
person is in misery, on the brink of starvation; no one's "rights" are violated. In regime B, Bill is
a cent worse off than he is in A, because a trivial violation of one of his rights occurs, and
everyone else is markedly better off. Chang's approach would require adopting regime A, because
Bill does not have to waive his right, which can be given infinite weight even though Bill hardly
cares about it and the rest of society suffers greatly. Now, if we imagine a regime C, in which no
rights are violated, Bill is much worse off than in A, and everyone else is better off than in A but
not as well off as in B, Chang's preference for higher overall welfare would lead him to choose C.
This time Bill has no veto because his right is not violated (even though Bill loses far more
moving to C than to B, where we gave him a veto). Of course, if one compares B and C, one can
see that everyone is better off in B-yet B was rejected (versus A) and C was adopted (versus A).
This, then, raises the question of which regime should really be chosen. (A is chosen over B,
because Bill has a right; B over C, because of adherence to the Pareto principle; and C over A.
because of the welfarism half of Chang's liberal welfarism.) If the choice is purely between A and
B, Chang says A is morally superior. If among all three, he says B is morally superior.
22. Relatedly, since the modified notion of fairness that emerges from Chang's procedure
may differ markedly from the original notion with which one began, it is also important to inquire
whether the original rationale for the notion will continue to be applicable (an inquiry that
obviously will be difficult if one cannot readily determine what the modified notion will look
like).
23. Chang, supra note 5, at 215-19.
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First, assume for the sake of argument that his procedures do work.
They only guarantee that the principle that emerges will not have Pareto
conflicts; nothing assures us that the principle will retain any substantial
fairness (that is, welfare-independent) content. Indeed, if the modified
principle satisfied our consistency assumptions, we know from our proof
that it would not retain any substantial fairness content. And, even if the
assumptions are violated, they were only sufficient conditions, so for all we
know there will be no fairness left after the procedures do their work.
(Moreover, none of the examples of modified fairness principles that Chang
has informally described to us over the past year, in his article or otherwise,
has in fact been a Pareto-conflict-free notion that is not solely based on
individuals' well-being. 4)
Second, in the domain our proof addresses, Chang's procedure cannot
work. The reasons, which are somewhat technical, are roughly as follows:
Even after an infinite number of iterations of his procedures, one would be
zero percent of the way done in generating the modified notion of fairness,
and the moves required in most of the iterations are impossible to make,
even in principle. 5 In addition, it turns out that one could not even use a
24. In prior exchanges with Chang, we have shown that his example, id. at 220-21, like others
he has suggested to us previously, fails. In the manner he has verbally interpreted the present
example to us, we have shown that his modified fairness function is not a notion of fairness as we
define it. (In essence, the only "fairness" left concerns distribution, which, as we have said
explicitly in all of our writings, is not included in our definition and thus not subject to our claim.
Supra note 2. Indeed, Chang identifies two aspects of social decision in his example. Chang,
supra note 5, at 220. The first ends up being governed by welfare, and not fairness, to avoid a
Pareto conflict, id. at 221, and the second involves the need to determine the distribution of
wealth, id. We further showed that other interpretations of his example (which may be what many
readers would infer Chang means from the first half of his article) would involve a violation of the
Pareto principle. Chang's statement that he has given an example of a notion of fairness (as we
have consistently defined it, see supra notes 2, 6) that does not conflict with the Pareto principle is
no more than a pure assertion that we have previously demonstrated to be false.
25. Chang's procedures make various comparisons, choose "best" points, and change
"ranks" in particular ways. However, on the domain that we considered, which realistically
allows for continuous variation (for example, in how much funds may be spent on courts or in
how much of a good people may have), there are what is formally referred to as an uncountably
infinite number of comparisons to make. And, the concept of "best point" (used in his first
procedure) is not defined, except at boundaries, as Chang acknowledges. Id. at 218 n.183. (By
analogy, if one is asked to state the second highest real number in the interval from 0 to 10.0,
inclusive, after the highest number (10.0) is removed, there is, as some readers will recall, no such
thing as the next highest real number. Yet Chang's procedure cannot move forward until the
second highest number is identified.) Moreover, the changes in "ranks" required in his second
procedure-which Chang explicitly offers to remedy the preceding problem-are undefined for
essentially the same reason. (Chang states that one should give an alternative a rank that is
"higher than the rank in question but lower than any higher rank." Chang, supra note 5, at 219.
Suppose that the "rank" in question is 10.0 and all the real numbers between 10.0 and 11.0 have
been assigned to other alternatives. Obviously, there does not exist a real number higher than 10.0
but no higher than any other real number between 10.0 and 11.0.) Chang's failure to write his
procedures in a more formal manner, actually to show their operation on the sort of domain in
question (which allows continuous variation of parameters), and to prove that any particular
output of the procedures has the alleged properties-despite our suggestions for over a year that
he do so-is suggestive of their underlying deficiencies.
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streamlined version of his procedure in an attempt to provide rough justice.
The reasons have to do with the very assumptions he eschews: Because he
rejects continuity, it is literally true that a very close approximation could
be wrong to an extent that is deemed infinitely weighty; and because he
rejects independence, it is always possible that skipping over some
possibilities-even ones that will not be chosen in any event-will be fatal,
because which possibilities one considers or skips can have a morally
decisive effect on other (seemingly unrelated) assessments. 6
III. CHANG'S LIBERAL WELFARISM
Most of Chang's discussion of his particular blend of liberalism and
welfarism has little if any bearing on our claim that notions of fairness
conflict with the Pareto principle. Nevertheless, we suspect that the aspects
of Chang's argument that suggest that individuals' "external" preferences
should be censored have intuitive resonance with many readers, for most of
us probably cringe at the thought of crediting, say, sadistic preferences.
Accordingly, we offer some comments about such external preferences
drawing upon our other writing, which considers a number of general
arguments that bear on external preferences and also contains a section that
addresses the specific topic.27 (We will be brief here, because the question
of how to address external preferences is not our focus in this Reply or in
the article that Chang criticizes.)
On its face, the idea that external preferences should be ignored raises a
number of questions, including the following: What is an "external"
preference? (If it means any preference regarding other individuals, as
suggested in most discussions, then one would have to censor preferences
for watching opera and sports events, for conversation and companionship,
indeed, for virtually all human interaction that was not purely instrumental
to some other end.2 ) Why should people have preferences regarding only
26. Thus, his statements that we could use "a reasonable rule of thumb" and eschew
"investing much of our scarce resources in the search for... Pareto improvements," id. at 230-
31, are wrong in his own framework. (Relatedly, he suggests that one may focus primarily on the
fairness optimum, id. at 231, but because he rejects our assumptions, this works only if that
optimum is identified in a literally perfect, precise manner, which of course is impossible.) It
should also be clear, contrary to Chang's suggestion, id. at 219 n. 186, that these defects are unique
to his particular approach. For example, under welfare economics (and most notions of fairness
that people actually believe in), only the policies under consideration would have to be evaluated
in order to choose among them, and the use of approximations would usually yield approximately
good results. (Indeed, in the latter part of his footnote, he acknowledges differences between
welfare economics and his approach but does not reveal how they render his, and only his,
procedure inoperable.)
27. E.g., KAPLOw & SHAVELL, supra note 1, secs. II.D, VIII.B.
28. Chang himself is difficult to interpret. He does not offer a definition of external
preferences and criticizes the one definition in the literature that he mentions explicitly. Chang,
supra note 5, at 183 n.40. In response to one of the definitional problems he mentions briefly, he
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other things and not other people? (Is a particularly narrow sort of
materialism meant to be endorsed?) Is it really acceptable to trump all
other-regarding preferences, including love for one's children, concern for
individuals in distress, and so forth? And what of negative external
preferences that have socially desirable effects (such as the feelings of
disapprobation that we have when others act wrongfully, the anticipation of
which often deters individuals from improper behavior)? Since, we
presume, only some preferences-and, from the foregoing, it would appear,
only some external preferences-are to be censored, who gets to choose
which ones? Using what criteria? On what grounds?29
We suggest, in our other writing, that the welfare economic framework
offers answers to these sorts of questions, allowing one to make reasoned
arguments about which external preferences really are socially problematic
and how and when it may make sense to adjust social policy in the light
thereof. In addition, that analysis suggests that the appeal of the common
view, which Chang exemplifies, in fact is related to these underlying
welfarist arguments. For example, we explain that it is no accident that
negative and socially counterproductive external preferences are most often
invoked in support of the preference-censoring view. Upon reflection, the
widely held antipathy (itself an external preference of sorts) toward such
other-regarding preferences as sadistic ones can contribute to the proper
socialization of individuals and also serve to discourage undesirable
behavior that may be undertaken to satisfy these types of preferences.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this Reply, we have reviewed our two main arguments, each of
which independently demonstrates that consistent adherence to any notion
asserts that we "can distinguish" the problematic preferences from others, by reference to which
preferences "are not 'intrinsically immoral,"' id. at 189 n.67, a patently question-begging
response, since the whole point of the distinction was to identify which preferences should be
deemed immoral. Finally, Chang concludes his discussion of censoring preferences by stating
that, to avoid what he regards as decisive objections to the preference-censoring position as
formulated by others, he would admit (that is, not censor) "personal preferences based on external
preferences." Id. at 191-94. This seems to imply, however, that although he would exclude the
preferences of, say, sadists that were expressed in terms of the supposed political inferiority of
their victims, he would admit sadistic preferences reflecting the pure pleasure of seeing the
victims suffer-hardly a distinction that succeeds in capturing the intuitions that Chang claims
motivate the preference-censoring view in the first place.
29. There exist additional difficulties as well. It is not clear, for example, how to define what
it means to censor a preference since, in general, the intensity of an individual's other preferences
may well depend on the extent to which the preference to be censored is in fact satisfied. Also,
paradoxically, censoring a preference could lead to results under which more of the undesirable
activity occurs. (Ignoring a sadist's preferences may lead us to deem him worse off-because a
source of his satisfaction is not counted-which under some distributive theories would entitle
him to a greater share of resources, part of which he may devote to satisfying his sadistic
preferences.)
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of fairness will make everyone worse off in some circumstances. A focus of
our discussion has been on the assumptions underlying the second of our
demonstrations of this point. We emphasized that the assumptions embody
basic elements of logical consistency that we would think anyone
advancing a normative principle for evaluating legal policy would embrace.
Although logic alone cannot demonstrate a normative conclusion, we do
believe that our result poses a challenge to those who would employ notions
of fairness in policy analysis, particularly since many such notions seem
motivated by concerns for individuals who might be unfairly treated,
whereas consistent pursuit of notions of fairness, we have shown, may be to
the detriment of everyone, including those same individuals.
We have not rehearsed a wide range of additional arguments that we
advance in our larger work in support of our general thesis that legal policy
analysis should depend exclusively on effects on individuals' well-being,
with no independent weight being given to notions of fairness. We do,
however, wish to elaborate briefly on one of the themes of this writing,
namely, how our thesis can be reconciled with the intuitions and instincts
that most individuals (including us) hold regarding various notions of
fairness.
An important part of the reconciliation concerns the respects in which
notions of fairness may be relevant under welfare economics, even though
they are not considered to be independent evaluative principles. First,
individuals may have tastes for notions of fairness, which is to say that their
well-being may depend on whether what they view to be fair treatment is in
fact provided. (Punishment that is substantially disproportionate to an
offense may be upsetting to many individuals.) Second, notions of fairness
may serve as proxy principles that may be useful in identifying policies that
advance welfare. (The notion of corrective justice holds that wrongdoers
should compensate their victims, the prospect of which tends to enhance
deterrence.) Third, notions of fairness can be important as rules of common
morality, which are valuable to teach and reinforce because they lead
individuals to be less opportunistic in their interactions in their everyday
lives. In all, we believe that the broad appeal of notions of fairness can in
many respects be reconciled with what we have shown to be serious defects
in the use of notions of fairness as independent evaluative principles-
including, importantly, that consistent adherence to such notions entails the
view that it may be desirable to choose policies that make everyone worse
off.
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